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ABSTRACT
Studies on learning concepts and principles from examples
and/or definitions have failed to yield consistent results to guide
educators. However, a recently resurrected theory of memory, schema
theory, can help explain contradictory results as well as suggest
a useful research methodology and an instructional aid for the
teaching of concepts and principles. The present study investiga-
ted the hypothesis suggested by schema theory that a "domain state-
ment" of a principle (a statement of the range of applicability of
the principle) would produce superior learning to presentation of
a principle or example alone or a principle in conjunction with an
example. Although the major hypothesis was not confirmed, the study
replicated earlier results that subjects perform better on test
items that are similar rather than dissimilar to the presented
example and that a pretest facilitates posttest performance. In
addition, the study utilized a methodology, principle analysis,
that could be a useful tool for both researchers and educators.
INTRODUCTION
Most learning in school is a matter of mastering the basic
ingredients of intellectual functioning -- the concepts and principles
interrelating these concepts. A "concept" is here defined as a class of
objects or events, all of whose members share certain features or attri-
butes. A principle consists of two or more concepts related in some way
(Gagne, 1965; Anderson & Faust, 1973) such that they form generalizations
or laws that apply to a universe of instances (Roderick, 1969). Despite
the obvious importance of concept and principle learning, educational
and psychological research to date provides woefully little guidance to
the practical educator. The results of laboratory studies have little
applicability to classroom learning, and the results of more realisti-
cally school-oriented concept learning studies are inconsistent and
confusing. Fortunately, a recently resurrected theory in cognitive
psychology, schema theory, offers a potentially fruitful perspective for
both researchers and educators concerned with the learning of concepts and
principles. From the perspective of schema theory it is possible to
explain the inconsistent results of concept learing studies as well as
to generate a useful methodology for future research. Furthermore,
schema theory suggests a potentially valuable aid for the teaching of
concepts and principles.
The study reported here was an attempt to use schema theory in
developing an experimental methodology as well as to investigate an
hypothesis suggested by schema theory concerning the teaching of princi-
ples. The study was designed to approximate the school learning situation
by focusing on the learning of principles from prose and using a measure
of "transfer" or "application" as the dependent variable.
Only one published study was found that pertains to the learning of
principles per se. However, there is a vast literature on concept learn-
ing. This literature would appear to be relevant to principle learning,
since principles are relationships between concepts. Therefore, this
paper will begin with a brief overview of concept learning studies per-
taining to the characteristics of the instructional situation. An outline
of schema theory will then be introduced, followed by the proposition that
schema theory provides a framework from which to interpret the results of
the concept learning studies as well as a suggestion for a potentially
more fertile approach to concept learning for both researcher and educator.
Schema theory will then be extended to principles, forming the basis of
the rationale for the present study.
Overview of Concept and Principle Learning Studies
A comprehensive source of information on experimental results
concerning the effect of characteristics of the instructional situation
on concept learning is Clark's (1971) review of hundreds of concept learn-
ing studies. The review discloses an impressive list of significant find-
ings; the detailed prescriptions that Clark derives from these findings
would seem hearty fare for classroom teachers starved for "scientific"
guidance in performing their concept teaching chores. Unfortunately,
however, major differences between the type of concept learning in the
traditional laboratory experiments reviewed by Clark and in the actual
school situation cast serious doubt on the appropriateness of generalizing
3such research findings to teaching in the classroom. Several critics
(cf. Carroll, 1964; Clark, 1971) have listed the major discrepancies
between the laboratory and school learning situations.
(1) The goal of the concept learning task is very different in the
laboratory and classroom situations. In most laboratory learning situa-
tions, subjects are asked to classify or categorize already familiar
stimulus dimensions until they have induced a concept such as "solid blue
triangle." Battig and Bourne (1961) claim that such studies are not in-
vestigating concept formation but merely concept identification. In
school, on the other hand, concept learning is likely to involve the for-
mation of totally new, unfamiliar concepts.
(2) The concept task or the strategy involved in learning the concept
is very different in the laboratory and classroom situations. Laboratory
studies primarily entail the inductive or "discovery" learning of concepts
from a presentation of positive and negative instances. School learning
usually involves the deductive or expository method of teaching concepts
whereby the individual identifies and describes the critical attributes of
the concept from a formal definition.
(3) The instances and dimensions of concepts in the laboratory context
are very different from the instances and dimensions of concepts in the
classroom context. The concepts of laboratory studies involve concrete,
physical, visually perceived objects having a finite number of dimensions
with finite, discrete values. Classroom learning, however, involves ab-
stract, verbally communicated concepts possibly having infinite dimensions
with infinite, continuous values.
(4) The evaluation of concept learning is different in the laboratory
and the classroom. In concept identification studies, the usual measure
of concept learning is acquisition: the experimental subject performs a
simple sorting task indicating whether or not the concept has been attained.
With school learning, on the other hand, the more important measure is a
measure of comprehension, transfer, or application.
In light of the sharp differences between laboratory and classroom
learning, it is doubtful
. . . whether there is any continuity, with respect to psycho-
logical "processes," between the inductive, nonverbal type of
learning studied in the psychological laboratory under the guise
of "concept learning" and the usually more deductive, verbal-
explanatory type of teaching used in the classroom and in typi-
cal text materials. (Carroll, 1964, p. 180)
Therefore, the results that Clark found are not thought to be sufficiently
relevant to a study of classroom concept learning to warrant further con-
sideration here.
Not all concept learning studies, of course, have been confined to
the laboratory. A raft of other concept and principle learning studies
have been conducted under conditions more closely approximating the class-
room learning situation. Here again, however, the practical educator
meets defeat in his quest for scientific guidelines, for the results of
this subset of concept and principle learning studies are contradictory
and confusing. With regard to the most relevant issue -- the use of
definitions and examples in teaching concepts and principles -- the con-
clusions range from one extreme to the other. At one end of the continuum
is the assertion "It is apparent that the definition by itself was not a
sufficient teaching technique to lead students to generalize and discrimi-
nate as completely as an instructor would want" (Markle & Tiemann, Note 2,
p. 5) while at the other end is the finding that " . . .people can easily
learn concepts from definitions" (Anderson & Kulhavy, 1972, p. 389). A
brief, nonexhaustive survey of studies ranging along the continuum follows.
Research on the Use of Examples Only
A study by Swanson (reported in Klausmeier, Ghatala, & Frayer, 1974)
investigated the effect of number and type of concept instances on the
acquisition of concepts in the absence of a definition. Sixth graders re-
ceived written lessons on three interrelated environmental concepts in one
of four treatment groups: (1) a "rational set" (Markle & Tiemann, Note 2)
(the instances logically needed to permit both generalization to new in-
stances and discrimination to noninstances) of both positive and negative
instances, (2) a rational set of positive instances but no negative in-
stances, (3) two positive instances and no negative instances, or (4) con-
trol -- three lessons unrelated to the test items. The four dependent vari-
ables measured were (1) correct classification of new instances, (2) over-
generalization, (3) knowledge of concept definitions, and (4) knowledge of
interrelationships among concepts. The important result was that subjects
in Treatment Condition 1 did better than subjects in the other three
treatment conditions, a result also found in a replication by Feldman
(reported in Klausmeier et al., 1974) using three mathematical concepts.
Klausmeier et al. (1974) conclude, "The results of these two studies, taken
together, suggest that a rational set of both positive and negative exam-
ples should be presented when teaching a concept" (p. 189).
Research on the Use of Both Examples and Definitions
A number of studies have either used a combination of definition and
examples or compared the role of examples vs. definitions in the
learning of concepts. Another study by Swanson (reported in Klausmeier et
al., 1974) employed the same three concepts as in the first study. In this
study the four treatment conditions are (1) definition plus a rational set
of positive and negative instances, (2) definition plus a rational set of
positive instances only, (3) definition plus two positive instances, and
(4) control -- three lessons unrelated to the test items. The posttest mea-
sured three variables of ability to correctly identify new instances, know-
ledge of concept definitions, and knowledge of interrelationships among
the concepts. Results showed no significant differences among the three
treatment groups on correct classification of new instances. A replica-
tion by Feldman (reported in Klausmeier et al., 1974) showed the same pat-
tern of no differences on all three dependent variables. The conclusion
of Klausmeier et al. (1974) on the basis of this study is
. . . the number and type of instances presented are less
important when a concept definition is provided than when
instances alone are used to teach a concept. If a concept
definition is given, the number and type of instances do
not have a significant effect on the classificatory level
of concept attainment. (p. 202)
Markle and Tiemann (Note 2) conducted a study concerning the concept
morpheme in which experimental subjects (college students) received either
a carefully constructed definition of critical attributes with or without
a minimum rational set of examples, the definition of critical attributes
and a technical statement of noncritical attributes with or without exam-
ples, or the definition of critical attributes and a nontechnical state-
ment of noncritical attributes with or without examples. The two depen-
dent variables were correct classification of new examples (generalization)
and nonexamples (discrimination). The results showed no significant
differences among the groups on the basis of type of definition, but the
provision of examples significantly improved generalization. A second
study comparing a group receiving a dictionary definition (including
examples) with a group receiving the dictionary definition plus a rational
set of examples also indicated that the addition of a full range of
examples improved generalization over a dictionary definition only. Markle
and Tiemann (Note 2) conclude that
S. . providing a full range of examples proved a more power-
ful variable controlling generalization than providing verbal
descriptions of the full range of examples, that is, the
statement of irrelevant attributes included in the definitions.
(p. 11)
Other studies employ combinations of examples and definitions in
teaching concepts. In another study by Swanson (reported in Klausmeier et
al., 1974) concerning the three environmental concepts, sixth graders were
in one of four treatment conditions: (1) rational set of both examples and
nonexamples, (2) rational set of both examples and nonexamples plus a
definition, (3) rational set of both examples and nonexamples plus a
definition plus prompting (question designed to direct the student's
attention to the critical attributes), and (4) control -- three lessons
unrelated to the test items. The dependent variables were identification
of new instances, knowledge of concept definitions, and knowledge of
interrelationships among the concepts. The results showed Condition 1
to be superior to Condition 2 and Condition 2 to be superior to Condition 3.
Surprisingly, Condition 1 subjects performed significantly better than
Condition 2 subjects; in this case, therefore, presentation of a defini-
tion actually suppressed concept acquisition. However, a replication by
8Feldman (reported in Klausmeier et al., 1974) showed the opposite effect:
in this case, definition plus instances was superior to instances alone.
Klausmeier et al. (1974) conclude
(a) Concept definitions alone may lead to a significant
amount of learning. (b) When a rational set of examples
and nonexamples is presented, the addition of a concept
definition may or may not facilitate concept mastery.
(p. 207)
Merrill and Tennyson (1971) conducted a study in which college
students were taught the concept of trochaic meter in one of eight treat-
ment conditions: (1) definition -- identification of the relevant attri-
butes shared by a set of objects in a given class, (2) attribute defini-
tion -- definition and clarification of each attribute of a concept class,
(3) exemplar-nonexemplar -- display of instances and noninstances of a
concept class, (4) attribute prompting -- explanatory information indica-
ting class membership and identifying relevant attributes for each exem-
plar and absence of relevant attributes for each nonexemplar, (5) defini-
tion plus attribute definition plus exemplar-nonexemplar, (6) exemplar-
nonexemplar plus attribute prompting, (7) definition plus exemplar-
nonexemplar plus attribute prompting, (8) definition plus attribute defi-
nition plus exemplar-nonexemplar plus attribute prompting. The four depen-
dent variables were the differences between predicted error scores and mean
error scores for correct classification of new instances, overgeneraliza-
tion, undergeneralization, and misconception. For the correct classifi-
cation dependent variable, the definition plus exemplar-nonexemplar treat-
ment groups performed significantly better than treatment groups provided
with only definitions or with only exemplars-nonexemplars. The most
effective treatment overall was the definition plus attribute definition
plus exemplar-nonexemplar plus attribute prompting.
9In a study by Johnson and Stratton (1966), college students learned
four concepts in one of five ways. One group was trained to define the
concepts in their own words after seeing nonsynonym definitions. A second
group was expected to match new synonyms to the concepts after learning
the concepts from four synonyms each. A third group was trained to classify
descriptions of objects and events as instances or noninstances of the con-
cepts. A fourth groups used the concepts in sentences after learning the
concepts from the context provided by a short story. A fifth "mixed pro-
gram" group received for each concept a paragraph containing a definition,
a context sentence, two synonyms, and an example. The dependent variables
were total and subtotal scores on an achievement test measuring ability to
(1) define each concept, (2) classify new instances of each concept,
(3) select new synonyms for each concept, and (4) use each concept in
a sentence. Results showed no evidence of a relationship between training
method and performance on the subtest corresponding to that method; all
single treatment methods performed equally well on all subtests. In other
words, for the purposes of this review, learning from a definition was just
as effective as learning from examples. However, for both dependent
variables, the mixed program, which included a definition and an example,
was the most effective.
Another study (Guthrie, 1967) concerned the learning of rules for
deciphering scrambled letter strings, or cryptograms. College students
were taught to decipher cryptograms in four experimental conditions:
(1) Example plus rule -- examples of cryptograms were presented for
deciphering until subjects reached a criterion of eight consecutive
correct responses; the deciphering rule (transpositional or
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substitutional) was then taught until the subject could verbalize it.
(2) Rule plus example -- the subject was first taught the rule and then
deciphered examples to the same criterion. (3) Example -- only examples
were presented until the criterion was reached. (4) Control -- the sub-
jects learned Russian vocabulary. Feedback (the cryptogram with the cor-
rect word beside it) followed each trial for the three treatment condi-
tions. The test consisted of 30 cryptograms. Ten were not used in train-
ing (remote transfer dependent variable); ten were formed from new words
and rules not used in training but drawn from the same class of rules
(near transfer dependent variable); ten were formed from new words but
using the same rule used during training (retention dependent variable).
Results indicated that (1) the Example group was superior to all other
groups on the remote transfer task, (2) the Example and Example plus Rule
groups were equal but significantly better than the other two groups for
near transfer, and (3) the Rule plus Example group was superior to all
other groups on the retention task. In addition, the Rule plus Example
group learned faster than the other groups. Therefore, this study indi-
cates that the superiority of single or combined methods depends on the
nature of the learning criterion.
One other study (Anderson, 1973), the only published study found on
teaching principles, also demonstrates the differential effectiveness of
the treatment depending on the nature of the criterion task. In this
study, high school students read a passage on classical conditioning in
one of three experimental conditions. One group (the control) read three
pages on classical conditioning. A second group read two pages on classi-
cal conditioning and one page on reinforcement and the principle that
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intermittent reinforcement causes resistance to extinction along with an
example illustrating the principle. A third group was identical to the
second except that different words conveyed the concepts intermittent and
resistance to extinction and a different example was used to illustrate
the principle. The posttest included items that assessed the subjects'
ability to apply the principle to instances that were either identical,
similar, or dissimilar to the text example. The results showed that
experimental subjects scored highest on identical items, slightly lower
on similar items, and significantly lower on dissimilar items. Thus,
performance on the criterion task was a direct function of type of example
used during learning.
This group of studies on the use of both examples and definitions,
then, yields a hodge podge of results: a definition mitigates the effect
of number and type of examples, examples used in conjunction with defini-
tions enhance learning, a definition presented with examples may inhibit
learning, a definition plus examples is superior to either condition by
itself, and the relative effectiveness of examples or examples with rules
depends on the nature of the expected performance.
Research on the Use of Definitions Only
To confuse matters even more, one study (Anderson & Kulhavy, 1972)
demonstrates that a high level of learning can result from definitions
alone. In this study, college students received two study-test trials
during which they saw one sentence definitions of 13 concepts. Half of
the subjects were instructed to say aloud a sentence containing the
defined word during the six second exposure of the definition; the other
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half were told to read the definition aloud three times. After each study
trial, subjects received two different test forms. Each form contained
one multiple-choice item for each concept in which subjects were to choose
the one alternative giving an instance of the concept. In the present
context, the important result is that subjects were able to learn concepts
from definitions alone, as long as they understood the definition.
In sum, the more classroom-oriented studies of concept learning do
not answer the question of which instructional situations optimize learn-
ing. In fact, the composite findings engender more confusion than enlight-
enment. As Klausmeier et al. (1974) put it
. . . research has not yet provided answers to such education-
ally important questions as: When introducing a new concept,
how much of instruction should rely on verbally presented
descriptions and definitions and how much on presentation of
concrete exemplars? (p. 156)
Fortunately, however, there is hope for explaining the results at at
least a general level within the context of cognitive psychology. Speci-
fically, schema theory appears to offer a promising perspective on the
process of learning concepts and principles. We turn now to an overview
of schema theory.
Overview of Schema Theory
A theory of memory based on schema was proposed by Sir Frederic
Bartlett in 1932 as an alternative to the "trace theory" of memory, which
posited that memory is a conglomeration of separate immutable traces that
represent exact copies of the original experience. According to the
schema theory of memory, on the other hand, new experiences do not main-
tain their specific identity in memory but upon encoding are assimilated
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into a general setting or framework (Bartlett, 1932) that represents the
central tendency or communality of the class of perceived events (Attneave,
1957; Gomulicki, 1956). A schema, then, is a "cognitive template"
(Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976, p. 51), a pattern or network of relationships
that generally hold for the constituents of the concept. Schemata are
S. abstract and stereotyped descriptions of things and
events. Schemata are abstract in the sense that they con-
tain a slot or place holder for each constituent element
in the knowledge structure. They are stereotyped in that
they indicate the typical relationships among the elements.
(Anderson, Pichert, Goetz, Schallert, Stevens, & Trollip,
Note 1, pp. 18-19)
In other words, schemata are characterized by two features: (1) stereo-
typed, constant relationships among (2) abstract, variable components.
The schema contains information about the constraints of the variable
components -- the nature of the variables and the range of possible values
each variable can assume. When the schema is activated in comprehension
or memory, it is instantiated: the variables are "bound" by particular
values; the "slots" or "placeholders" in the abstract structure are filled
by specific instances.
With schemata, therefore, we can make sense of a situation whenever
that situation can be interpreted as a particular instance of the appro-
priate generic concept in memory. Even if the incoming information is
incomplete, the variable constraints and relationships within and
between schemata allow us to make good guesses about unspecified variables,
in other words, to assign "default values" (Kuipers, 1975) in order to
complete the instantiation of a partially activated schema. For example,
one can visualize an object as a cube even if only some of its planes and
edges are in view. Presumably the schema for cube is activated from minimal
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information about the interrelationship of faces, edges, and vertices, and
the process of instantiation fills in the missing data. The same process
seems to be a likely explanation for the experimentally verified phenomenon
that in reading prose, general terms are typically encoded on the basis of
a context-dependent instantiation. Anderson et al. (Note 1) claim, for
instance, that in the sentence "The woman was outstanding in the theater,"
the words "outstanding" and "theater" activate interrelated schemata in
such a way that "actress" becomes the most probable instantiated value for
the general or variable term "woman."
The process of instantiation upon encoding has important implications
for retrieval from memory (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976). At encoding, the
activated schemata assume certain values and patterns as a function of the
particular context of the input. Retrieval of this original input depends
on reactivation of its schematic structure by an additional input, or cue.
But since each instantiation is context-dependent, a cue will be effective
at retrieving the original schemata only to the extent that it triggers
the same instantiation as did the original input. "Consequently changes
in the contextual conditions prevailing at retrieval time compared with those
at the time of presentation, may result in a failure to recognize the
second presentation" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976, p. 29). Schema theory
is in this regard quite consistent with the empirical and theoretical
work of Tulving and Thomson (1973). Based on research showing failure
to recognize recallable list words, Tulving and Thomson formulated the
"encoding specificity hypothesis" which could well be a tenet of schema
theory: "Specific encoding operations performed on what is perceived
determine what is stored, and what is stored determines what retrieval
15
cues are effective in providing access to what is stored" (p. 369).
Thus, according to both schema theory and the notion of encoding specifi-
city, retrieval is highly dependent on the perceptual and cognitive condi-
tions at the time of encoding.
Schema theory gives an elegant account of how knowledge is stored in
human memory and what happens during comprehension and recall. In a ten-
tative way, schema theory can also account for learning, where learning is
viewed as the process of schema formation and modification. Still a neo-
nate among learning theories, schema theory suggests the involvement of
the following processes in learning (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976). Schema
specialization occurs when the variables of the schema become further con-
strained so that the range of possible values is narrowed. In this way,
a schema becomes less abstract, i.e., more highly differentiated or
specialized. Schema generalization occurs when a narrowly restricted or
fixed portion of an existing schema is replaced by a variable to produce
a new, more abstract or more generalized schema.
Having presented an overview of schema theory and its explanations of
the storage of knowledge in memory, comprehension as a function of that
stored knowledge, and learning as a process of schema change, we turn now
to a discussion of how schema theory relates to the learning of concepts
and principles.
Schema Theory Applied to Concept and Principle Learning
In the context of schema theory, the acquisition of a concept can be
construed as the formation of the appropriate schema in memory. In schema
terminology, we can say that a student has learned a concept when he has
16
stored in memory a data structure bearing the appropriate constant
relationship among the attributes or dimensions of the concept as well as
the range of possible values these dimensions can assume. "Adequate know-
ledge" of the concept implies that the corresponding schema is neither too
specialized nor too generalized. The degree of specialization is such that
the individual knows the limits of the range of acceptable variables; i.e.,
he can discriminate instances from noninstances. The degree of generaliza-
tion is such that the variables are not overly constrained; i.e., the indi-
vidual can generalize to new instances of the concept.
The learning of a new concept can proceed through either generalization
or specialization. In the case of generalization, an individual encounter-
ing a concept for the first time is unable to assimilate it to an existing
schema and will thus encode the information in its entirety as a sort of
"schema" without variables, necessarily restricted to the values of the
only instance perceived so far. As similar instances are encountered,
differences between the encoded elements and the perceived elements cause
the constants to be generalized to variables until the appropriate variable
constraints have been established. In the case of specialization, the
learner begins with a very general, abstract schema; successive encounters
with instances of the concept establish constraints on the variables and
cause the schema to become refined to the appropriate range of applica-
bility.
When concept learning is viewed in terms of schema formation, the
results of the concept learning studies can be more productively evaluated.
Schema theory calls attention to the fact that two aspects of the studies
17
must be considered: the encoding processes and the retrieval processes.
Both of these processes will be considered in turn.
Some studies showed that examples alone can be effective in producing
concept learning. The explanation for this is that examples supply the
evidence to structure the schema, including the generalization of an
overly specialized schema or the specialization of an overly generalized
schema. In the words of Rumelhart and Ortony (1976),
. . . The role of examples in instruction can be regarded as
providing individual cases in which a schema can have its
variables bound; well-chosen examples will fully exploit such
a schema by showing the nature and bounds of values that its
variables can take. (pp. 51-52)
Schema theory can likewise explain the results of the studies that
showed the superiority of learning from definitions and rules, for it
is the very purpose of definitions and rules to convey the nature and
limits of the concept variables and the relationships among them. In
fact, provision of definitions or rules would seem to be a more efficient
and effective way to communicate schemata, since the individual is spared
the error-prone, inductive process of building up a schema "from scratch."
. . .Providing information in a structured form most closely
resembling the structure of the schema which will be required
for its interpretation maximizes the likelihood that the in-
terpretation will be appropriate and minimizes the processing
required. (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976, pp. 50-51)
Therefore, schema theory could be regarded as providing vindication
for the conflicting research results: examples or definitions or both
will work because they are all able to foster schema development.
Unfortunately, the issue of an effective method for teaching concepts
cannot be so readily resolved, for not just any old examples or defini-
tions will do. In order to foster the development of the appropriate
18
schema using examples, the examples must be "well-chosen"; i.e., there
must be exactly the right type, number, and sequence of examples to
convey adequately the constant relationships among variables and the
nature and limits of those variables. Presenting an incomplete set of
examples can lead to undergeneralization, overgeneralization, or miscon-
ception. In the Anderson study (1973), for instance, the presentation
of just one example appeared to produce undergeneralization, since sub-
jects performed more poorly on items dissimilar to the presented item.
In other words, the schema they encoded on the basis of one presented
example was overly specialized.
On the other hand, in order to produce the appropriate schema using
a definition, the definition must be " . . . in a structured form .. .
closely resembling the structure of the schema" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976,
pp. 50-51). This prescription presupposes knowledge of the actual schema
structure as well as ability to render the structure into a comprehensible
verbal format. A deficient definition can produce the same learning
problems as an inadequate set of examples.
The requirements for effective examples and definitions are extremely
stringent. It is unlikely that the conditions have been met by most of
the researchers whose studies are cited earlier in this paper. The most
successful method in each case is likely to be the one that, because of
a lucky choice of examples or a fortuitous wording of the definition,
comes closest to communicating an "adequate" schema. The studies are thus
not a fair test of the relative effectiveness of examples and definitions
in the encoding process of concept schema formation.
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When we turn to a consideration of the retrieval process, the research
results become even more equivocal. Relative effectiveness of methods
is determined by performance on criterion tests. But according to schema
theory, supported by the encoding specificity research, the effectiveness
of a retrieval cue is a function of the ability of the cue to activate
the schema formed on the occasion of the original input. Therefore, per-
formance on a criterion test may not be a measure of the adequacy of
schema formation at all, but merely of the similarity between the retrieval
cue (test item) and the original input. In the absence of explicit infor-
mation on the nature of the criterion task and its relation to the learning
task in most of the reviewed studies, it is not certain what the dependent
variables measure. Unless the criterion task can be shown to measure the
content of the supposedly encoded concept schema, the measure obtained is
not an index of concept learning.
In sum, applying schema theory to concept and principle learning has
implications for both instruction and research: Concepts and principles
must be analyzed in order to determine, as accurately as possible, the
structure of the schema to be encoded, i.e., the constant relationships
and the nature and bounds of the variables constituting the schema. Such
an analysis will reveal the type and number of examples or the form of
the definition needed to convey the schema during instruction. It will
also yield a source of test items which are legitimate measures of the
extent of schema formation. If such practices are followed, instruction
should become more systematic and effective and research should produce
some interpretable results.
20
Principle Analysis
The present study focused on principle analysis. The particular
hypothesis guiding the study stemmed from the notion that
. . . providing information in a structured form most closely
resembling the structure of the schema which will be required
for its interpretation maximizes the likelihood that the in-
terpretation will be appropriate and minimizes the processing
required. (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976, pp. 50-51)
It was thought that performing a principle analysis would reveal "the
structure of the schema" to the extent that a definition of the domain
of the principle could be generated. The specific hypothesis that emerged
was that presentation of such a definition or statement of the domain of
applicability of a principle, derived from an analysis of the principle,
would produce greater transfer (ability to apply the principle to instances
not previously encountered) than either presentation of an example of
the principle alone or an example in conjunction with a statement of the
principle or a statement of the principle alone. A related hypothesis was
that treatment would interact with transfer task. Specifically, it was
hypothesized that transfer with the "example" conditions would be greater
for instances similar to the presented example than for instances dissimi-
lar to the presented example.
Before the study could be launched, it was necessary to establish
a methodology for performing a principle analysis. No real precedents
for principle analysis had been set. The closest approximation was found
in Anderson's (1973) study of principle learning. In this study Anderson
attempted "to accurately capture the full sense of the principle" (p. 28)
by generating an elaborated statement of the principle with letters sub-
stituted for each possible variable. Although Anderson did not relate
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principle analysis to schema theory, his analyses seemed to capture the
supposed structure of a schema -- "an abstract and sterotyped descrip-
tion" (Anderson et al., Note 1, p. 18) entailing constant relationships
among variable components. Therefore, a similar approach to principle
analysis was pursued in the present study.
Four psychological principles were selected for analysis. The
principles were first written in common English in a way that would
capture the constant relationships of the principle. The following is
an example of the common English statement of one of the selected principles
(transfer of learning):
Simplified somewhat, the first two of Osgood's "Laws of Transfer"
are:
(1) If a second learning task consists of a different
stimulus but the same response as the first learning
task, the second task will be easier to learn than
the first (positive transfer).
(2) If a second learning task consists of the same
stimulus but a different response than the first
learning task, the second task will be harder
to learn than the first (negative transfer).
Next, all variables in the principle statement were assigned letters.
The transfer of learning principle became:
An organism y in environment z learns a first task in which a
stimulus (A) is followed by a response (B).
(1) If a second task consists of a different stimulus
(C) but requires the same response (B), then y_ (in z)
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will find the second task easier to learn than the first
task.
(2) If the second task consists of the same stimulus (A) but
requires a different response (D), then y (in z) will
find the second task harder to learn than the first task.
Then a "replacement set" was constructed for each variable. The
replacement set was designed to convey the bounds of the variables, or the
range of values that the "slots" in the schema could assume. Since the
nature of the experiment required only two replacement sets for each varia-
ble, the bounds were often artificially constrained, a situation which need
not occur under normal conditions. The replacement sets for the transfer
of learning principle are shown below:
nonhuman
Organism (y)
human
circus
Environment (z)
laboratory
auditory
Stimulus (A,C)
visual
motor
Response (B,D)
nonmotor
The "domain statement" for the principle was then constructed.
Prefaced by "It is believed that this principle applies to . . . " the
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domain statement went on to suggest that all variables could be replaced
by both members of the corresponding replacement set. The following is
the domain statement for the transfer of learning principles:
It is believed that these principles apply, among other things,
to animals in circuses and people in experiments. The stimulus
could be almost anything that can be either seen or heard, and
the response could be any physical movement or verbal reply.
The replacement sets were also used to create examples of the principle.
One member of each replacement set was chosen, and a concrete exemplar of
that general term was selected. The concrete exemplars were then substi-
tuted for the corresponding variables in the original principle statement.
For the purposes of this study, a second example was created from the other
members of the replacement set. In this way the two examples for each
principle were related to the principle along the same dimensions, but
they differed in the values of those dimensions. Here is one example so
created:
For example, a seven-year-old boy in a laboratory
experiment has learned to say "George Washington" after
he is shown the word "President." The boy will find it
easier to learn a second task in which he must say "George
Washington" after he is shown the word "General." The boy
will find it harder to learn a second task in which he must
say "Thomas Jefferson" after he is shown the word "President."
In a similar manner, the replacement sets were used to construct the
multiple-choice criterion items testing transfer. Different exemplars of
the members of the replacement set than those used in the instructional
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example were selected. The antecedent of the principle, with the specific
instances substituted for the corresponding variables, was presented as the
stem of the item. The correct consequent, again with the specific instances
substituted for the corresponding variables, appeared as an alternative
along with several other plausible distractors. Within the context of
this study it was thus possible to generate test items that were similar
to the instructional example (i.e., instances of the same members of the
replacement set) or dissimilar to the instructional example (i.e., instances
of the opposite members of the replacement sets). The following are
"similar" and "dissimilar" test items for the example presented above.
Similar: In a laboratory a housewife has been trained to shout
"Great!" when she sees a "Brand X" detergent passing
by on a conveyor belt. According to the principles of
transfer of learning, she will have a simpler time
mastering a second requirement in which she must
1. shout "Clean" when she sees Brand X.
2. shout "Great!" when she sees Brand A.
3. shout "Clean!" when she sees Brand A.
4. shout "Clothes!" when she sees Brand Z.
5. shout "Wash!" when she sees Brand Y.
Dissimilar: A zebra has been trained to stand on his rear legs
when the circusmaster claps his hands. According to
the principles of transfer of learning, the zebra will
find it more difficult to learn a new trick in which
he must
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1. stand on his rear legs when the circusmaster
rings a bell.
2. give a bow when the circusmaster says "Go!"
3. balance on a stool when the circusmaster rings
a bell.
4. balance on a stool when the circusmaster claps
his hands.
5. lift one foreleg when the audience applauds.
To summarize, principle analyses were conducted in order to yield:
(1) a statement of the domain of applicability of the principle that
hopefully approximated the structure of the schema to be encoded,
(2) examples of the principle that spanned the domain of applicability,
and (3) systematically produced test items that bore an operationally
defined relationship to the instructional input.
The above procedure laid the groundwork for an investigation of the
two major hypotheses. To repeat, these hypotheses were
(1) Transfer would be greater with a statement of the domain of
applicability of the principle than with a presentation of an example
alone, the principle alone, or the principle plus an example, and
(2) Transfer would be greater for instances similar to the presented
example than for instances dissimilar to the presented example.
A final, subsidiary interest in the study was to further test the
question of whether a pretest has a "priming" effect on learning from
prose. As Anderson and Biddle (1975) found in their comprehensive review
of adjunct questioning studies, questions asked before passages containing
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the answers have a significant facilitative effect on performance on
repeated criterion test items but an inhibiting effect on performance on
new criterion test items. This study was designed to test the hypothesis
that a pretest will facilitate performance on repeated posttest items.
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METHOD
Subjects
Three hundred ninety-five juniors and seniors from a middle to upper-
middle class public high school in suburban Chicago participated in the
study.
Design
The design was a 2 x 3 x 4 x 6 factorial design. The three between-
subjects factors were type of pretest (two levels), type of principle
(four levels), and treatment condition (six levels); the within-subjects
factor was type of item on the criterion test (three levels). For the
pretest factor, subjects received either a 12-item multiple choice pretest
identical to the criterion test or the Surface Development Test (Educa-
tional Testing Service, 1962) which required them to visualize how pieces
of paper can be folded to form three-dimensional objects. For the factor
involving type of principle, subjects received a passage concerning either
cognitive dissonance theory, reinforcement, transfer of learning, or
reaction time experiments. Subjects received one of six levels of treat-
ment: (1) Principle only. Subjects received a description of a principle
related to the passage they read. (2) Principle plus Domain Statement.
Subjects received a description of a principle related to the passage they
read as well as a statement of the "domain of applicability" of the prin-
ciple, as described previously. (3) Principle plus Example 1 and (4)
Principle plus Example 2. Subjects received a description of a principle
related to the passage they read and one of two examples illustrating the
principle. (5) Example 1 Only and (6) Example 2 Only. Subjects received
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one of two examples illustrating a principle related to the passage they
read but not a statement of the principle itself. All subjects received
the three levels of posttest questions -- six "general" items testing
retention of the relevant passage content and two sets of three items each
assessing comprehension of the relevant principle, one set similar to
Example 1 (and dissimilar to Example 2) and one set similar to Example 2
(and dissimilar to Example 1). In addition, the 54 item version of the
Wide Range Vocabulary Test (French, Ekstrom & Price, 1963) was adminis-
tered to all subjects in order to obtain a measure of verbal ability to
be used as a covariate.
Materials
Four passages were written to provide the background information and
conceptual base deemed necessary for an understanding of the four psycho-
logical principles. The passages ranged in length from about 275 words
(cognitive dissonance theory) to about 550 words (reinforcement). Descrip-
tions/explanations of the related principles were then prepared for each
of the passages. These descriptions/explanations ranged in length from
about 70 words (transfer of learning) to about 275 words (cognitive dis-
sonance theory). The passage and description/explanation for the principle
of transfer of learning is found in the Appendix.
A "domain statement," two instructional examples, and six test items
were constructed for each principle in the manner previously described.
Three of the items were similar to Example 1 but dissimilar to Example 2;
the other three items were similar to Example 2 but dissimilar to Example 1.
Six additional multiple-choice achievement test items were constructed
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for each passage. These items were considered filler items because they
related to the passage proper rather than to the principle itself, which
is the concern of this study. These six items were derived from close-to-
verbatim text sentences and required the student to select the deleted
element. Since such items can presumably be answered on the basis of
orthographic or phonologic encoding, they cannot be considered to be
measures of "comprehension" (Anderson, 1972).
Five alternatives were provided for each of the 12 multiple-choice
items: the correct response alternative and four plausible distractors.
For the subjects receiving a pretest identical to the criterion test, the
items appeared in different random orders for the two test administrations.
In order to facilitate machine scoring, items across the four passages
were matched in the sense that (1) for each item number correct responses
were in the same position across the four forms, (2) items similar to
Example 1 were in the same position within the test, and (3) items similar
to Example 2 were in the same position within the test.
One constructed response item was also included in the test. For all
passages, this item asked subjects to explain the relevant principle.
Experimental booklets were assembled in the following order: pretest
directions, pretest, passage-reading directions, passage, vocabulary test
directions, vocabulary test, posttest directions, posttest. The vocabulary
test was placed between the passage and the posttest in order to minimize
recall from short-term, nonsemantic memory.
Procedure
Over two days, the experiment was run in the subjects' classrooms by
three experimenters using standard instructions. The subjects were
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assigned to conditions by distributing randomly ordered stacks of the
booklets containing the experimental material. Set amounts of time were
allowed for each of the four sections of the task; these times appeared to
be adequate for subjects to complete the task.
The pretest, vocabulary test, and posttest multiple choice items were
machine scored. For the posttest items, separate scores were obtained for
the six general items and the two sets of three transfer items each.
Comparable scales were obtained by dividing the "general" total by six
and the "transfer" totals by three. The open-ended responses were not
scored for this study.
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RESULTS
A preliminary analysis was done to determine if an analysis of
covariance using verbal ability as a covariate would be useful. First,
a three way analysis of variance with the factors of pretest, principle,
and treatment was conducted using score on the Wide Range Vocabulary Test
as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed no significant differences
between groups on any factor. Second, in an analysis of variance with
posttest score as the dependent variable, the reduced error term that
would result from eliminating the effect of verbal ability was computed.
The formula used was
2 1
a e2 ( - p1w) + f 2 )
e
using the unadjusted mean square (.185) as an estimate of ae2 and the
squared correlation between verbal ability scores and dependent variable
(r = +.40904; r2 = +.16731) as an estimate of pw2  The adjusted mean
square thus computed is .15455, which still fails to yield a significant
F ratio for the treatment effect. Thus, it was decided to proceed with
an analysis of variance rather than an analysis of covariance.
An analysis of variance with the factors of pretest, principle,
treatment, and item set was conducted using posttest score as the
dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 1. All results
subsequently reported as significant are significant at p < .01. The
one nonsignificant main effect was treatment condition. Thus, the
hypothesis that subjects receiving the principle plus a domain statement
of the principle would score higher than subjects receiving a principle
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Table 1
Analysis of Variance Summary Table
Posttest Score
Source df SS MS F
Between
Pretest
Principle
Treatment
Pretest x
Pretest x
Principle
Pretest x
Error
Principle
Treatment
x Treatment
Principle x Treatment
Within
Item Set
Pretest x Item Set
Principle x Item Set
Treatment x Item Set
Pretest x Principle x Item Set
Pretest x Treatment x Item Set
Principle x Treatment x Item Set
Pretest x Principle x Treatment
x Item Set
Error
*t
**
p
2
2
6
10
6
10
30
30
694
4.55
0.21
4.93
2.97
0.41
0.52
1.43
0.98
2.27
0.10
0.82
0.30
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.03
37.45 0.05
< .01
< .00001
1
3
5
3
5
15
15
347
1.76
2.38
0.57
1.25
0.77
2.16
2.66
64.22
1.76
0.79
0.11
0.42
0.15
0.14
0.18
0.19
9.50*
4.29*
0.61
0.24
0.83
0.78
0.96
42.12**
1.97
15.23**
5.51**
1.25
0.95
0.88
0.60
- -- -- ~-- ~- -~ - --c--~ - --- t- ~ ~-- - - ~ I- --~- ~ -- --~~---
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only, an example only, or a principle plus an example was not confirmed.
The hypothesis that subjects receiving a pretest identical to the post-
test would outperform subjects receiving an irrelevant pretest was con-
firmed. A second significant main effect was that of Item Set. The means
are reported in Table 2. A Tukey's HSD test showed a significant dif-
ference between scores on general items and scores on both similar and
dissimilar items that barely missed significance at the .05 level.
Table 2
Mean Proportion Correct
as a Function of Item Set
Type
of Mean
Item Proportion
General .58
Dissimilar .44
Similar .48
The hypothesis that treatment would interact with item set was also
confirmed. The means for the four treatments that included examples are
presented in Table 3 and the interactions are plotted in Figure 1. A
planned comparison confirmed the prediction about the effect of examples on
transfer. Subjects performed significantly better [t(694) = 2.5] on trans-
fer instances that were similar to the example they had seen than on items
that were dissimilar to the example they had seen. For whatever it is
worth, subjects also scored significantly higher on the general retention
items than they did on either the similar [t(694) = 4.5] or the dissimilar
[t(694) = 6.9].
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Table 3
Mean Proportion Correct
Treatment x Item Set Interaction
for Treatments Including Examples
Treatment General Dissimilar Similar
Principle + Example 1 0.60 0.42 0.58
Principle + Example 2 0.62 0.49 0.47
Example 1 Only 0.58 0.35 0.56
Example 2 Only 0.58 0.54 0.39
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.62
.60
.58
.56
.54
.52
0
U0
*H42-
r .480
o .46
S.44
O Examp:
.42
0 Examp:
.40
A Princ:
.38 Exar
.38
36 - , Princ:
F Exan
,34 -
0.00 .. I I I
General Dissimilar Similar
Figure 1. Treatment x Item Set interaction
I - - - ' -- ' - ~-
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A peculiar result appearing in Table 3 and Figure 1 is that the
relative position of means on similar and dissimilar items for treatment
conditions including Example 1 is quite different from the situation found
with treatment conditions including Example 2. In other words, in
Example 1 treatments the dissimilar transfer item means were substantially
below the similar transfer item means whereas in Example 2 treatments
the dissimilar item means are at least somewhat greater than the similar
item means. A possible explanation was that the two item sets differed
in difficulty level. An analysis of variance with the two "absolute"
item sets (no longer defined relative to the example presented) as depen-
dent variable confirmed this suspicion.
The original analysis of variance also revealed a significant main
effect for Principle. The mean proportion correct for the four principles
are reported in Table 4.
Table 4
Mean Proportion Correct
as a Function of Type of Principle
Mean
Principle Proportion
(1) Reinforcement 0.47
(2) Cognitive Dissonance 0.46
(3) Transfer of Learning 0.51
(4) Reaction Time 0.58
_ _ _ _1_ ____ _~ ___ _~ _ __
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A Tukey HSD test for all pairwise comparisons among means failed to reveal
any significant differences. Although unusual, this situation can
occur because the over-all F ratio is equivalent to a simultaneous test
of the hypothesis that all possible comparisons among means are equal to
zero. Therefore, for this set of data, the significant comparison could
involve some undetermined linear combination of means (Kirk, 1968).
The Principle x Item Set interaction was also significant. From
the means in Table 5 and the plotted interactions in Figure 2 it can be
seen that Principle 4 behaved in an aberrant fashion. A Scheff6 test
verified that Principle 4 means were significantly higher than the
average of the other three principle means on general, dissimilar, and
similar items.
Table 5
Mean Proportion Correct
Principle x Item Set Interaction
Principle General Dissimilar Similar
1 0.57 0.41 0.43
2 0.64 0.34 0.41
3 0.64 0.42 0.45
4 0.51 0.60 0.62
.64
.62
.60
.58
.56
.54
u .52
8 .50
048
*S .48
o .46
.44
.42
.40
.38
.36
.34
*Principle 1
- Principle 2
OPrinciple 3
A_ Principle 4
o.oo I I I
General Dissimilar Similar
Figure 2. Principle x Item Set interaction
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DISCUSSION
Although the results failed to confirm the pedagogical hypothesis
that presentation of a principle in conjunction with a domain statement
would produce superior learning to presentation of a principle or example
alone or a principle in conjunction with an example, there were several
potentially important aspects to the study.
First, the study utilized the crude beginning of a methodology that
could prove useful to both educators and researchers -- principle analysis.
By analyzing the constant relationships and variables of principles and
delineating the range of values those variables can assume, it is possible
to systematically generate the full range of examples and comprehensive
definitions that are needed for adequate schema development. Since the
domain of possible examples is defined by such an analysis, it is also
possible to construct domain-referenced achievement tests, which are
valid and sensitive indices of comprehension and transfer. Analysis of
principles is important to the instructor because he knows what to teach
and how to assess whether his teaching has been effective. Analysis of
principles is important to the researcher because he can operationally
define his independent variable of instruction and his dependent variable
of criterion test so that his results are interpretable and comparable
to the results of others using the same analytic procedure.
Second, the study replicated and extended the result of the
Anderson (1973) study: When instruction includes a single example,
subjects perform better on test items that are similar to the presented
example than they do on test items that are dissimilar to the presented
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example. This result is quite consistent with schema theory. When a
single example is presented, the schema will tend to be overspecialized
so that only a very narrow range of cues will serve to reactivate it. A
retrieval cue similar to the original input will be interpreted in the
same way and will reinstate the original schema, but a dissimilar retrieval
cue will be interpreted in a novel way and will thus fail to reinstate
the original schema.
Finally, the study confirmed once more the finding that a pretest
has a "priming" effect on learning from prose when the pretest consists
of items that will be repeated on the criterion test. Presumably the
questions direct the reader's attention to those facts that are apparently
important for him to know within the context of the particular task. One
who is exposed to a pretest probably also becomes "test wise"; he knows
the precise nature of the task he is likely to have to repeat at some
point in time.
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APPENDIX
PASSAGE AND DESCRIPTION FOR
TRANSFER OF LEARNING PRINCIPLE
P-I
Transfer of Learning
An important problem in education is the extent to which the learning
of one thing affects the learning of something else. The influence that
one task may have on the subsequent learning of another is called trans-
fer of learning. Transfer of learning may take three different forms:
1) learning one task may aid or increase learning on a second task, which
represents positive transfer, 2) learning one task may detract from
learning on a second task, which represents negative transfer, or
3) learning one task may have no effect on another task, which is known
as zero transfer.
Early educators believed that transfer was a very general phenomenon.
They assumed that individuals had faculties (such as reasoning, memory,
or perception), that, like a muscle, could be developed by exercise.
Reasoning from this formal discipline approach, therefore, educators
advocated memorizing poetry to strengthen the memory and studying geometry
to discipline the mind.
In contrast to the formal discipline approach, the famous psychologist
E. L. Thorndike proposed that transfer was much more restricted. Thorndike
claimed that training transfers only as long as certain features of the
two tasks, such as aims, methods, and approaches, are identical. Pub-
lished in 1914, this "theory of identical elements" proposed that "a
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change in one function alters any other only in so far as the two
functions have as factors identical elements." These elements, though
not precisely defined, apparently could be fairly general. Thorndike
felt, for example, that training in addition helps with multiplication
(both operations share the identical element of addition).
Experimental psychologists following Thorndike focused on two
"elements" -- the external situation or event (the stimulus) and the
organism's reaction or response to the stimulus. Therefore, in comparing
a previously learned task with a new one in order to determine what the
transfer effects would be, these experimenters analyzed changes in both
stimulus and response.
In 1949, C. E. Osgood reviewed the existing literature on transfer
and formulated generalizations which he claimed could accurately describe
all of the experimental results. These principles became knows as
"Osgood's Laws of Transfer." Although subsequent studies have shown
that Osgood's generalizations do not apply in all cases, these principles
nevertheless represent a landmark in the work on transfer of learning.
P-2
Simplified somewhat, the first two of Osgood's "Laws of Transfer" are:
1) If a second learning task consists of a different stimulus but the
same response as the first learning task, the second task will be
easier to learn than the first (positive transfer).
2) If a second learning task consists of the same stimulus but a
different response than the first learning task, the second task
will be harder to learn than the first (negative transfer).
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